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INTRODUCTION

This survey is in large part merely what Professor Chafee once
characterized as a horizontal digest. In the previous survey a request was made that interested members of the Bar advise the
"Editor-in-Chief of this Review whether the character of the annual
survey of this subject should be changed. The request is repeated
herewith.
In this connection it should be said that it is difficult to frame
satisfactory comments on the work of our courts in this field without
knowledge of the contents of the record. The opinions are of such
varied character in many important respects that their bearing
upon the efficient administration of justice in general can not be
evaluated. To what extent the members of the court other than
the opinion writer have a real acquaintance with the record cannot
be known. The practice in the various states differs radically. In
the New Jersey Supreme Court, at least while Chief Justice Vanderbilt was presiding, each member of the court had, before argument,
studied the record and briefs and had noted the problems on which
he needed help from the oral argument. In the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, neither the record nor the briefs are
studied by any member of the court before argument, and are seldom
studied thereafter except where the argument has left some matter
unsolved. In some others only the opinion writer reads the record;
consequently his interpretation of it must be accepted by the other
members except where the oral argument has left a contrary impression. And a reading of the opinions during a period of about
ten years has made it reasonably clear to this surveyor that many
statements in opinions cannot have met the approval of some members
of the court. Where the result, on the whole, seems satisfactory the
content of the opinion is rarely adversely criticised. As a result this
survey leaves very much to be desired. In some instances where
there have been "trials by newspaper" which to an outsider seem to
make a really fair trial almost, if not quite, impossible, no satisfactory
comment can be ventured without a careful examination of the
record. And such a comment is scarcely to be recommended, for the
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chief purpose of a survey is to present the judicial pronouncements

which may furnish some sort of guide to probable future action by
the courts.
I. PLEADING--DEIVURRER

1. Operation and Effect.-A demurrer is addressed to a pleading
and presents an issue of the sufficiency of the averments of fact therein to call for a response in denial or avoidance. The pleading may
include the contents of an accompanying writing incorporated therein
by reference, but is neither aided nor harmed by an accompanying
writing, designated as an exhibit, which is not so incorporated.'
The commonly used generalization that a demurrer admits the
truth of all well-pleaded allegations of fact is inaccurate and misleading unless qualified. The admission is effective only for the
purpose of testing the sufficiency of the allegations. In truth a demurrer is merely a default on the facts and raises only an issue of
law. When it is overruled with leave to plead, it ceases to have any
effect if later pleadings are interposed. This is made clear in a recent
decision. The chancellor had held in overruling a demurrer that a
specified averment in the bill was sufficient. After defendant had
answered denying this averment, the chancellor heard the evidence
and found for defendant. The court of appeals held specifically that
his ruling upon the demurrer did not prevent him from finding the
2
fact to be contrary to the well-pleaded averment.
2. Slander-SpecialDamage.-A complaint which alleges the utterance, in the presence of others, of defamatory statements which do
not charge plaintiff with the commission of a crime or misdemeanor,
and does not allege special damages resulting therefrom, is demurrable. An allegation that the uttered statements were "you are drunk.
...

You are drunk and you were driving that car under the influence,"

is insufficient to charge a crime or misdemeanor in the absence of
averment that the incident occurred on a public highway in the
State of Tennessee. Hence such an allegation without an averment
3
of resulting special damage fails to state a cause of action.
3. Motion to Dismiss and Quash in Habeas Corpus.-A motion to
dismiss the petition in habeas corpus and to quash the writ is
properly considered as a demurrer. When the petition stated no ground
for the issuance of the writ, the motion was properly granted even
4
though a return was filed.
1. Holland Bros. Elec. Co. v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 326 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn.
1959).
2. Slomovic v. Tennessee Hosp. Serv. Ass'n, 333 S.W.2d 564

M.S. 1959).
3. Smith v. Fielden, 326 S.W.2d 476 (Tenn. 1959).
4. State ex rel. Tines v. Bomar, 329 S.W.2d 813 (Tenn. 1959).

(Tenn. App.
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II. PARTIES
1. Class Suits-Representative Suit for Vacation Pay.-Where a
class suit is brought for vacation pay based on length of term of
continuous employment by a group of employees acting for themselves and other employees similarly situated, each employee has a
separate claim for a specific amount. No employee is claiming a
share in a fund in the custody or control of the court or of the defendant. Such a suit is appropriate where the parties are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court and
there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights
and a common relief is sought. This in effect is the kind of action
provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (a) (3). Obviously
a judgment therein cannot affect any member of the class who is
not a party to the action. The court is not empowered to order
the defendant to pay into court the total possible amount for which
defendant may become liable. This is the kind of situation which
Chafee classifies as "Invitation to Come In." 5 The proper procedure
is to provide for intervention by any member of the class and to
fix a time within which intervention will be allowed. Such was the
disposition of such an action by the Tennessee Supreme Court in
Textile Workers Union v. Brookside Mills, Inc.6 Each employee party
to the action was entitled to judgment in his favor for the amount
found due to him.
2. Answer and Cross-bill Bringing in New Parties.-P,subcontractor, sued D for money on an account. D answered that P's claim was
for work done by P as subcontractor of a contract between C and D,
and P as such subcontractor of C performed defectively to D's damage,
and asked that the answer be treated as a crossbill against C and
prayed judgment against C. C answered and asked that its answer
be treated as a crossbill against P. The court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 21-620 new parties may be brought in
upon a crossbill and that C's answer should be treated as a separate
crossbill against P. Since all the claims grew out of the same transaction, the bill, answer and crossbill should be tried together.
III. REMEDIES
A. Certiorari
1. From Order of Commissioner of Finance and Taxation-Scope
of Review by Circuit Court.- On certiorari by the registered owner
5. See CHMFEE, SOME PROBLEMS IN EQUITY,
disapproving Fm. R. Civ. P. 23.
6. 326 S.W.2d 671 (Tenn. 1959).

ch. VII (1950) discussing and

7. Ralph Rogers & Co. v. Allied Constr. Co., 326 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1959).
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and conditional vendor of an automobile to review an order of seizure
and condemnation by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation the
only issues for the circuit court are (1) whether the Commissioner
acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently or (2) whether there was
material evidence to support his order. When on examination of the
evidence the supreme court finds that the Commissioner would have
been justified in determining that the conditional vendor had not
made a sufficient investigation of the vendee's reputation and that
the vendee was operating the automobile in transporting liquor,
the judgment of the circuit court reversing the order of the Commissioner must be reversed.8
2. From Denial of Claim for Recovery of Seized Property by Director of Game and Fish Commission.-The sole remedy for the recovery of property seized and confiscated by the Game and Fish Commission is by filing a claim with the Director of the Commission,
and by certiorari to the circuit court from an adverse decision, as
provided by Tennessee Code Annotated sections 51-711,-712. Hence an
order of the circuit court for the return of property thus seized, made
after and because of acquittal of the criminal charge on which the
seizure was based, is erroneous and must be reversed on appeal. 9
3. Declaratory Judgment as Alternative.-Parties aggrieved by
action of the Board of Accountancy are entitled to have it reviewed
by certiorari, 10 but where the board has granted an applicant a
license to practice as a public accountant, certiorari is not the exclusive remedy. A suit for a declaratory judgment against the board
and the applicant, declaring that the board has no right to grant
to the applicant a license to practice may be properly entertained."
B. Coram Nobis-Supersedeas
The writ of coram nobis is authorized and regulated by statute in
Tennessee, 12 and the judge may or may not order it to operate as a
supersedeas. 13 One ground for the writ for relief from the judgment
is that the defendant, petitioner, was prevented from making his
defense by surprise, accident, mistake or fraud without fault on his
part.14 A demurrer to the petition seeking the writ on this ground
is properly overruled when it: (a) alleges that petitioner had appeared in the action and had filed a demurrer to the complaint, and
8. Boyd v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 330 S.W.2d 13 (Tenn. 1959).
9. State v. McCrary, 326 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1959); TENN. CODE ANN.
51-709, -712, -715 (1956).
10. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-901, -902; 62-125, -135 (1956).
11. Coleman v. Blackburn, 333 S.W.2d 562 (Tenn. 1960).
12. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 27-701 to -708 (1956).
13. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-703 (1956).
14. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-702 (1956).

§§
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after the demurrer had been overruled, had failed to answer because
of assurances by plaintiff's (claimant's) attorney that the suit would
be dismissed and (b) sets out a meritorious defense. 15
C. Habeas Corpus-Sufficiency of Petition
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleged that the judgment
that defendant, petitioner, was guilty of rape, was void because
the indictment charged that the offense was committed on April 25,
1957, while the proof showed that it was committed on April 24, 1957.
The petition was so fatally defective that had judgment been rendered
for the petitioner, it would have been subject to reversal on motion
in arrest. Hence, an order dismissing the petition and quashing the
16
writ was affirmed.
IV. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
1. Burden of Proof of Agency.-Where P is suing D on a contract made with P by A as alleged agent for D, the burden is upon P
to persuade the trier of fact that A was acting within the scope of
his authority as agent for D. This may be proved by circumstantial
evidence, including evidence of what A had previously done with the
7
knowledge and consent of D.1

2. Alibi in Criminal Prosecution-Measure of Persuasion.-There
is much misleading and confusing language in the Tennessee opinions
concerning the burden of proving the so-called defense of alibi. The
language in Smith v. State'8 adds to it. The court there said that "the
defense of alibi, like any other fact in the trial of a criminal prosecution, must be clearly, certainly and fully established by the proof,
and these facts, that is, of an alibi, are left to the jury, with other proof
in the cause." It is no doubt true that the Tennessee courts have
approved the practice of charging that defendant has the burden
of proving an alibi, but they have also ruled that it is error to
refuse to explain what is meant thereby as bearing upon the issue
of guilt. On request the judge must instruct the jury that if the
proof, including that of alibi, raises a reasonable doubt of defendant's
guilt, he must be acquitted, and nowhere is it intimated that his
proof of alibi must be established by the measure of persuasion applicable to propositions of fact provable by the prosecution. Indeed,
quite the contrary is true, and it is said to be the better practice
15. White v. Adams, 325 S.W.2d 236 (Tenn. 1959).
16. State ex rel. Tines v. Bomar, 329 S.W.2d 813 (Tenn. 1959).
17. Rich Printing Co. v. Estate of McKellar, 330 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App.

W.S. 1959).
18. 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).
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not to charge on the defense of alibi as a separate defense. 19
No one has yet been able to explain how a jury can apply an instruction which requires a positive finding of absence from the scene
of the crime on the issue of alibi by any measure of persuasion and
yet must acquit if the evidence of alibi, when considered with the
evidence, raises a doubt as to guilt.
3. Venue in Criminal Prosecution.-The burden of proving the
venue in a criminal prosecution is upon the state. But the measure
of persuasion is the same as in an ordinary civil action, usually
stated as "by a preponderance of the evidence." What is meant, it
is submitted, is that the trier must find the state's proposition of fact,
that the offense occurred within the designated territory, to be more
probably true than not. The statement refers to the means by which
the jury is to be persuaded. Of course, the required evidence may
be circumstantial. 20
4. Presumption of Innocence-On Appeal from Conviction.-The
accused is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of innocence in
the trial of a criminal prosecution; but after a verdict of guilty
approved by the trial court and judgment thereon, the presumption no
longer prevails. On appeal the accused is said to be presumed guilty,
and in order to prevail on appeal, he has the burden of persuading
the appellate court by the preponderance of the evidence that he is
not guilty.21 It is worth noting again that the Tennessee rule which
condemns the direction of a verdict for an accused and does not
authorize an appellate court on reversal of a conviction to order
judgment for defendant does not signify that he is without protection
against unjustified verdicts. First, the judge is, in effect, a thirteenth
juror, and is bound to set aside a verdict of guilt if he would not as a
juror have voted for the verdict. Further, the supreme court will
review the evidence and if it finds the preponderance against the
verdict, will reverse the judgment. Finally, if the court believes that
there is no case against the accused, it will recommend that the case
be "nolle prossed."
5. Affirmative Defense-Capacity of Foreign CorporationTo Sue.The defendant who relies upon the defense that plaintiff is a foreign
corporation and has not been domesticated has the burden of persuading the trier of fact on this issue in an action by the corporation
upon a promisory note.2 This is universally true, for this defense is
in abatement. The statute does not purport to affect the validity of
19. See Odeneal v. State, 128 Tenn. 60, 157 S.W. 419 (1913).
20. Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).
21. Smith v. State, 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).

22. Shoenterprise Corp. v. Butler, 329 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
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the contracts made within the state by the corporation.
6. Considerationfor Promise-StatutoryPresumption-PrimaFacie
Evidence.-Under a statute making a writing, signed by the party
to be bound by the promise or undertaking therein, prima facie
evidence of consideration, the Tennessee court has said that the
writing raises a presumption which the signer has the burden of
overcoming.2
Whether this refers to the burden of going forward
with the evidence or the burden of persuading the trier does not
appear. Since no evidence was introduced, the allocation of the
former burden was decisive.
7. Statutory Presumption or Prima Facie Evidence Re Motor
Vehicles.-The legislature in 1957 amended the statute in an attempt
to clarify or harmonize some of the decisions regarding the effect to
be given to the fact of ownership of a motor vehicle upon the issue
of responsibility for its operation on a specified occasion. The
amended statute2 4 provides that proof of ownership of a motor
propelled vehicle shall be prima facie evidence that: (1) it was being operated and used with the authority, consent and knowledge of
the owner in the very transaction out of which the injury or cause
of action arose and (2) it was then and there being operated by the
owner or by the owner's servant for the owner's use and benefit and
within the course and scope of his employment. The expressed
legislative intent is that the statute be given a liberal interpretation.
The Court of Appeals Middle Section has indicated that the effect
to be given to the provision is not to be determined by whether or not
"prima facie evidence" creates a presumption. And this is a wise
decision in view of the hopeless conflict in interpretations of that
word. The legislative intent seems clear, as the court holds, that the
truth of the stated propositions is not destroyed by evidence to the
contrary which is contradicted or comes from witnesses whose
credibility is subject to question. 25 It is suggested that the statute
should be construed as making ownership of the vehicle establish the
stated propositions of fact (1) unless and until the evidence to the
contrary is such as to require a directed verdict, in which event the
court will direct a verdict for the owner, or (2) unless and until evidence to the contrary has been introduced which would justify a
finding that the stated propositions are untrue, in which event the
question is for the jury.
Whether in this situation the burden of persuasion should be on
23. Douglas v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 326 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn.

1959); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1702 (1956).
24. TENN. CODE ANN. § 59-1037 (1956).

25. Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
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the owner is a question of policy. It may well be that the expressed
intent that the statute be liberally interpreted indicates that the
burden be put upon the owner.
Prior to the amendment the Court of Appeals Western Section-held
that the statute put upon the owner the burden of going forward
with credible evidence of lack of authority or consent, and that the
burden was not satisfied if there was any substantial evidence to the
contrary or to discredit the contrary witness by his own statement
or other contradictory proof. In this situation, it was said, the
statutory presumption remains in the case. Whether this meant that
such evidence made the issue one for the jury is not clear.2 6
V. JUDIcIAL NOTICE
The current judicial opinions deal with propositions of stated
specific facts, frequently the result of generalized knowledge. Thus
the court has taken judicial notice (1) that three days give ample
time for papers mailed in Memphis to arrive in mail delivered in
Nashville;2 7 (2) that a candidate for Governor of the state or for
28
United States Senator selects and appoints his campaign manager;
(3) that "Chas." is an abbreviation for "Charles," used in a record
of conviction of crime in a sister state; 29 (4) that it is customary for
an insured to accept and keep insurance policies without reading
them;30 (5) that a narrative bill of exceptions is almost always
less nearly complete than one including a stenographic report of the
testimony; 31 (6) that the yellow lines painted on the inclines on
the highway are put there to warn motorists and others to stay in
their own lane and that the upper ends of these lines are at the
place where a view is available over the crest; 32 and (7) that a
county or municipality which purchases its power from TVA would
lose in collectible taxes much that would be assessable against and
collectible from a privately owned power company if it did not receive an equivalent amount from TVA.33 But a Tennessee court
may not judicially notice as true the proposition that a pinball
machine is necessarily a gambling device within the terms of a
26. Moore v. Union Chevrolet Co., 326 S.W.2d 855 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
27. Personal Loan & Fin. Corp. v. Guardian Discount Co., 332 S.W.2d 504
(Tenn. 1960).
28. Rich Printing Co. v. Estate of McKellar, 330 S.W.2d 361 (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1959).
29. Cumbo v. State, 326 S.W.2d 454 (Tenn. 1959).
30. Henry v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 330 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1958).
31. State v. Stewart, 326 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

32. Cawthorn v. Mayo, 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

33. Rutherford County v. City of Murfreesboro, 326 S.W.2d 653 (Tenn.
1959).
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municipal ordinance, since it may be used or played upon for innocent
purposes. 34
In Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks35 the court, in effect, treated the mortality tables published in Tennessee Code Annotated as judicially
known to be prima facie correct, for it held it no error to allow counsel
to read from them in his argument to the jury though they had not
been offered in evidence.
VI. EVIDENCE
A. Relevance
1. Introductory.-It is commonly said that the one rule of evidence
subject to no exception is that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. As
James Bradley Thayer insisted, the law has no mandate to the logical
faculties. Relevance is determined not by rules of law but by rules of
logic. It is confusing to speak of legal relevance as contrasted with
logical relevance, although many judicial opinions do use the phrase
when rejecting logically, relevant evidence.
Relevance denotes a relationship between facts. The existence of
fact A is relevant upon the issue of the existence of fact B, if the
existence of A makes it more likely or probable that B exists than
it would be if A did not exist. If so, then evidence tending to prove
that A exists is relevant as tending to prove that B exists. The
relationship or lack of it between fact A and fact B is a matter of
human experience.
2. Testimonial Evidence.-In litigation where the dispute concerns
a matter of fact, one party will have the so-called burden of establishing the truth of a proposition which states the existence or nonexistence of a fact. The fact will very rarely occur in the courtroom
in the presence of the trier of fact. It will have occurred at a
previous time and its occurrence will usually be the subject of
testimony by witnesses who perceived it or some other matter which
tends to show it. (Of course, this means that the witness asserts that
he perceived; he may in truth be mistaken or falsifying.) In such
event it is obvious that, whether or not conscious of the process, the
trier of fact must interpret the language of the witness, determine the
sincerity of the witness in making the communication, consider the
factors affecting the memory or purported memory of the witness,
and decide how far the observation or perception of the witness coincided with what was open to perception by him.
34. Smith Amusement Co. v. Mayor & Board of Comm'rs of Chattanooga,

330 S.W.2d 320 (Tenn. 1959).
35. 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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3. Real Evidence.-Where a relevant quality of a tangible is perceptible by the trier of fact, the tangible is admissible in evidence.
Though testimonial evidence may be required to establish its relevance, the relevant quality needs no testimony to make it apparent to
the trier; he need not rely upon the capacity of anyone else to
determine its perceptible quality or qualities. It is said to be real
evidence, for it is itself the "res" or thing. It is what it is and nothing
else, and what it is and its significance are for the trier. Experiments
performed in court are, of course, real evidence of what is observable
by the trier; but the significance of what is thus observable depends
upon the testimonial evidence that the exhibition is substantially
identical with what happened on a former occasion and is in dispute.
An experiment performed out of court is not real evidence and
testimonial evidence is required to describe the experiment and to
establish that it was a substantial repetition of the original. Thus
evidence of an experiment performed at the scene of a motor vehicle
accident in conditions substantially the same as at the time of the
accident is admissible even though the automobile used was not the
same but had the same pertinent characteristics. 36
4. Direct and Circumstantial.-Where the witness testifies to his
perception of an operative fact, his testimony is said to be direct
evidence; where he testifies to his perception of a fact which is a
basis for an inference or series of inferences of the existence or
non-existence of an operative fact, his testimony is termed circumstantial evidence. Thus evidence of defendant's flight from the scene
of a crime is circumstantial evidence of his guilt. The inference from
the objective conduct, flight, is the subjective condition, belief or
consciousness of guilt, and the inference from the belief is to the
conduct which caused the belief; namely, commission of the offense.
There is much talk and repeated assertion in judicial opinions to
the effect that a trier of fact may not base an inference upon an
inference. If this means that a trier may not find the existence of
fact C when he has found first the existence of fact A and inferred
therefrom the existence of B and thence inferred the existence of C,
then it is clearly erroneous. Every attempt to sustain the validity of
the generalization results only in verbal justification of the result,
whether or not a careful analysis would demonstrate a valid reliance
upon the last of a series of inferences. The effect of the formula is
often avoided by a judicial declaration that the finally inferred fact
was properly found by a consideration of all the evidence. The opinion
in Gable v. Tennessee Liquified Gas Co. 37 recognizes the rule but
36. Luckey v. Gowan, 330 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
37. 325 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
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as usual makes no attempt to apply it according to its literal terms.
It finds the result justified by the circumstantial evidence and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.
5. Similar Occurrences.-That P later secured liability insurance
not only upon trucks but also on trailers used with the trucks from
an insurance company doing business within the state, is a relevant
fact as tending to show that the agent who wrote P's insurance had
authority to write the same kind of insurance covering P's trailer
trucks, and evidence of that fact was admissible to contradict or impeach the testimony to the contrary by the latter agent. 38
6. Prior or Contemporary Conduct in Same Series.-On a charge
of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, evidence is admissible
of defendant's earlier conduct in his continuous dealings with the
minor, and evidence of her contemporary complaint to a minister of
the gospel while defendant was still engaged in course of those dealings is receivable in corroboration. As to this latter, it is not clear
whether the evidence was admitted to prove the truth of the facts
39
stated or only to prove the fact of the complaint.
7. Tending To Prove Motive.-In a prosecution for grand larceny,
on the issue of felonious intent, evidence is admissible that various
implements commonly used in the forcible opening of a safe were
found in defendant's car. The safe had been moved from the office
40
in which it was usually located into the main part of the building.
8. Other Crimes.-While evidence of crime other than that with
which defendant is charged is inadmissible against him, still defendant cannot object to evidence offered by the state of such other
offenses as were inquired about by his own counsel on his direct
41
examination.
9. CharacterEvidence.-In an action by a mother for the seduction
of her daughter, where the only contested issue was the amount of
damages, evidence of bad reputation of the mother and insinuation on
cross-examination of serious misconduct of the daughter were relevant, but the failure of the mother to offer character witnesses
affected only the amount of damage suffered, and the verdict of
$20,000 for plaintiff indicated that the jury had found against defendant on the matter of reputation, and that the insinuations had
been properly considered as increasing the damage 42 In cases of
38. Henry v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 330 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1959).

39.
40.
41.
42.

Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
Caruso v. State, 326 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1958).
Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
Graham v. Smith, 330 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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this kind the court generally is reluctant to interfere with the verdict
on account of its amount.
B. Hearsay
1. Admissions-Introductory.-At the outset it is essential to distinguish between judicial admissions and non-judicial or extrajudicial admissions. A judicial admission is conclusive; it removes the
admitted proposition of fact from the realm of dispute in the case.
It may be made by the pleading of the party or by a stipulation. To
enable a party to introduce evidence contrary to his judicial admission, he must first withdraw or modify it and for this the consent
of the court is required. His extra-judicial admission is not conclusive, but is received as tending to prove the truth of the matter
admitted. Evidence of such a statement seems always to have
been receivable since the introduction of evidence at a trial was first
permitted. The fundamental theory is that evidence of any and all
relevant conduct of a party is admissible when offered against him.
2. Judicial Admissions-Pleadings.-Where plaintiff in his complaint alleged that the cause of his driving as he did in this instance was that he was blinded by the lights of an approaching car,
he cannot be permitted over objection to testify to facts in clear
conflict with this allegation.43 The court went on to say that the
plaintiff himself was estopped, and that the credibility of his witnesses testifying to the inconsistent facts was certainly affected by the
allegation in the complaint. If the allegation was a judicial admission, it was conclusive so long as it was not withdrawn or amended,
and there was no pertinent issue to be tried. If so, then all evidence
to the contrary of the allegation was inadmissible under the pleadings.
This does not mean that plaintiff should not be permitted to amend if
he can show that the allegation was inadvertently or mistakenly
made. Whether the trial court should have treated the situation as
if plaintiff had been permitted to amend is quite another question.
3. Exceptions-(a) Extra-Judicial Admissions.-On the trial of
accused for embezzlement under a statute denouncing embezzlement
by a public officer, a previous statement by the accused ("I took it
and spent it on my family") is receivable in evidence against him as
an admission, and his later payment of the amount in question is an
admission by conduct. This evidence is sufficient to sustain the
verdict and judgment of conviction, especially since the defendant
did not testify.44 If this statement is to be regarded as a confession,
43. Woods v. Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
44. Blackwood v. State, 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
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requiring corroboration, the requirement was obviously satisfied.
(b) Vicarious Admission-Predecessor in Title.-On the issue
whether the previous use of a driveway covering part of defendant's
land had been permissive or adverse, evidence of declarations by
plaintiff's predecessor in title while in possession that the use was
permissive was receivable against plaintiff. 45 This is an application of
a well-settled rule, though obviously plaintiff never had any opportunity to cross-examine the predecessor and there is no requirement that he should have had any previous knowledge that the
statement had been made.
(c) Mortality Tables.-Mortality tables are admissible in evidence
as tending to prove the life expectancy of the plaintiff as bearing
upon the amount of damage suffered by him from injuries resulting
46
in alleged partial permanent disability.
(d) Admission That a Third Party Expressed a Relevant Opinion.In a prosecution of a defendant (Reynolds) for conspiracy to kill
certain named persons and for felonious assault with intent to
murder, a witness was permitted to testify that a short time before
the case was set for trial this defendant had told her that he had been
advised by the "Teamsters' Union" to go before the congressional
committee then investigating so-called labor racketeering and "take
the Fifth Amendment." The court said: "This was competent because
it was another circumstance which the jury could consider to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant Reynolds." For
this amazing statement the court gave no reason. It is now generally
held that evidence of a claim of privilege against self-incrimination
is not admissible as tending to prove his guilt. But even if this court
holds otherwise, how did the "union" give the advice; certainly there
is no suggestion that there was such official conduct by the union
as a body. Consequently this can mean only that some unnamed
person or persons gave the advice. In either case, even assuming
that the advisors were honest, it is at best a statement of opinion
founded upon undisclosed data, and the admission that he had been
given the advice could not reasonably be construed as indicating that
he believed it to be true. Any careful analysis would have disclosed that this evidence was entirely incompetent. Whether its
47
reception was cause for reversal is quite a different question.
45. Pyron v. Colbert, 328 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

46. Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
47. Smith v. State, 327 S.W.2d 308 (Tenn. 1959).
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I
C. Opinion
1. Insanity-Lay Opinion-Required Foundation for Admissibility.
-The opinion of a lay witness that testator was insane must be based
on facts personally perceived by him, and facts which have only a
scintilla or glimmer of value as tending to prove insanity do not
suffice. Nor is opinion based on such insufficient data aided by
similar opinion evidence of other witnesses whose observed facts have
48
no greater probative value.
2. Expert Witness-Value-Admissibility and Weight.-The reasonable value of the services of an attorney for an intervenor who set
up two notes payable to intervenor in proceedings under a creditors'
bill is a question for the court. The Master allowed ten per cent of
the amount due on the notes. The attorney assigned error in that
the amount should have been fifteen per cent. Opinion evidence of
three reputable attorneys that the amount should be at least fifteen
per cent was admissible but was not conclusive though uncontradicted. Approval of the Master's finding by the Chancellor was not
49
erroneous.
D. Best Evidence Rule
1. Summaries of Original Worksheets.-Multigraphed audits compiled and edited by third persons without producing the original worksheets and compilation were received over objection and the ruling
was conditioned upon producing and making available to defendant
the originals prepared by the witness. If there were any error, it was
cured where the originals were produced on the second day of the
trial and made a part of the record. 50 Of course, the originals were
real evidence of their contents.
2. Official Acts of Quarterly Court.-The official records of the
quarterly court are in themselves the action of the court and the
sole admissible evidence of it. This does not mean that where purported action was oral and was relied upon by a party, it is impossible
for the court to ratify the transaction by a later official record.
51
The later official record constitutes the action of the court.
E. Parol Evidence Rule
1. Contemporaneous Contradictory Promise.-Where plaintiffs
entered into a written agreement with definite stipulations and terms
and as a part thereof executed and delivered their promissory note,

48. Curry v. Bridges, 325 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

49. Harriman Welding Supply Co. v. Lake City Lightweight Aggregate
Corp., 330 S.W.2d 564 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
50. Blackwood v. State, 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
51. Bozeman v. State, 330 S.W.2d 553 (Tenn. 1959).
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the fact that after considering the matter for a few days they decided that the whole agreement was impractical was no ground for
rescission, and the oral assurance of the other contracting party that
they would not have to pay the note was entirely ineffective.5 2 This
is an application of the orthodox rule. There was no claim of
fraudulent inducement.
2. Parol Evidence of Title.-In a criminal prosecution for cutting
timber from the lands of another without the consent of the owner
of the timber, the state must prove either actual possession of the
land by the alleged owner or constructive possession under color of
title, or must deraign his title from the state or from a common
source, and this deraignment must be evidenced by writings. Oral
testimony is insufficient.53 In reaching this result the court disapproved Pepper v. Gainsboro Telephone Co.54
3. Parol Evidence To Identify Person Named in Document.-In an
action brought in Tennessee on a judgment rendered in Virginia
against the judgment debtor after purported service upon a Tennessee motorist under the Virginia hit-and-run statute, evidence that
statutory notice by mail was delivered to the father of the motorist
whose name was identical with that of the motorist, and that in
the Tennessee action the summons was served on the father, was
receivable upon the appearance by the motorist to attack the
Virginia judgment for lack of due process. The sheriff's return in
the pending action was not conclusive as to the identity of the judg55
ment debtor.
F. Weight and Sufficiency
1. Negative Testimony.-Testimony of a witness that he did not
hear a whistle or bell as the train in question approached a crossing
is not to be disregarded where it appears that he was in position to
hear the sound of the whistle and of the ringing of the bell had they
occurred, and his testimony may be credited over positive testimony
of other witnesses that they did hear the whistle and bell.56
2. Expert Opinion.-Upon the issue whether a workman had a
seizure of vertigo, the testimony of an expert that there was a fifty
per cent probability that he could have had such a seizure is insufficient to justify a finding. No fault can be found with this result,
but the court's statement that it constitutes "no evidence whatsoever"
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Kilgore v. Hix, 327 S.W.2d 474 (Tenn. 1959).
Yates v. State, 332 S.W.2d 186 (Tenn. 1960).
1 Tenn. App. 175 (U.S. 1925).
Keene v. Wilkerson, 325 S.W.2d 286 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
Poe v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 326 S.W.2d 461 (Tenn. 1959).
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is obviously inaccurate, for the opinion states a relevant proposition
57
of fact.
G. Witnesses
1. Examination-Offer of Proof.-Where an objection had been
interposed and sustained on the ground that the accused could not
show on cross-examination of the prosecuting witness the terms of
the oral agreement which was integrated in a written contract, the
witness was then asked: "How did you expect to pay Mr. Miller?"
The trial judge sustained the objection. On appeal the court stated
that the record did not show the expected answer and that if the
objection was erroneously sustained, the error was not ground for
reversal. It is generally said that when an objection is sustained to a
question on direct examination, the proponent must inform the
court in. some proper manner what he expects the answer of the
witness to be. Otherwise on a "new trial," if granted, the answer may
be of no value on the issue. But on cross-examination the examiner
is in no position to state more than what he would like to have the
answer tend to show. And there is no obligation to do more than
58
show that the question calls for a relevant answer.
2. Competency-Interested Survivor.-On the issue of whether
testator had promised to pay a bonus for the year 1957 to each of three
employees, claimants, there was circumstantial evidence tending to
show such promises. Each of the claimants offered to testify that
the testator had made such a promise to each of the others individually; the report does not show any offer of testimony of a
promise made to all three as a group. On analysis it is obvious that
no employee had any interest in the claim of any other, and unless
his offer to testify as to the other promises was for the purpose of
supporting his own claim, he could not be said to be an interested
survivor as to the claim of another. Yet the court treated the promises
as a joint promise and held each claimant incompetent. It upheld the
judgment of the county court in favor of each plaintiff on the ground
that it was sufficiently supported by the other evidence.59
3. Impeachment-Judgment of Conviction.-The Tennessee courts
have adopted the majority view that a witness may be impeached
by evidence that he has been convicted of a crime, that the conviction
may be shown by testimony of the witness on cross-examination, and
that the pendency of an appeal does not destroy its admissibility. It is
said that the crime must be one involving moral turpitude. Whether

57. Bledsoe County Highway Dept. v. Pendergrass, 330 S.W.2d 313 (Tenn.
1959).

58. Miller v. State, 332 S.W.2d 179 (Tenn. 1960).

59. Durham v. Webb, 330 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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an assault with intent to commit "murder in the second degree"
involves moral turpitude depends upon the circumstances-but cer0
tainly "pistol whipping" a young girl does involve moral turpitude.6
VII. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
A. County Court
1. Wills Administration.-Where a previously appointed administrator resigned after discovery of a will and appointment of executor
and submitted his account in which he failed to list as assets of the
estate the sum of $5000 received by him from the testator a short
time before testator's death, the executor filed formal exceptions to
the account. The county court clerk and the county judge overruled
the exceptions. On appeal the circuit court affirmed on the ground
that it had no authority to determine the issue of fact. The court of
appeals reversed and on certiorari the supreme court held that the
statute6 ' required a trial de novo on appeal of all chancery cases and
cases in the nature of a chancery proceeding. The case was properly
remanded to the circuit court which had jurisdiction to try it as if
the proceedings had been commenced in that court.6 2

2. Wills Contest.-Where a will is presented for probate in solemn
form and opposing parties appear to contest it, the county court must
immediately transfer the cause to the circuit court. Hence when
proponent petitioned for probate of a will in solemn form and an
opposing party presented for probate in solemn form a later will
containing a provision revoking all former wills, this constituted a
contest and both petitions should have been certified to the circuit
court. It was error for the county court to probate the first will, and
the circuit court on appeal should have held the decree of probate
63
void. The contest was of the first will and not of the second.
B. Court of General Sessions Createdby PrivateAct-Sumner
County-Powerto Increase Jurisdiction
Under Article XI, section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution, the jurisdiction of a court of general sessions created by private act cannot
be increased by legislative act alone. Such a legislative act must
require that it be approved either by a two-thirds vote of the local
legislative body of the county or by a majority of the voters voting
in an election in the county. The legislative Act of 1957 (Ch. 203,
60.
61.
62.
63.

McGee v. State, 332 S.W.2d 507 (Tenn. 1960).
TENN. CoDE ANN. § 27-408 (1956).
Teague v. Gooch, 333 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1960).

In re Ambrister, 330 S.W.2d 330 (Tenn. 1959).
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Private Acts 1957) purporting to amend the private act is void.6 4
C. Chancery
1. Inherent Jurisdiction-Controlof Bar.-Courts of chancery, as
well as the supreme court, have inherent power to investigate alleged
unethical practices of members of the bar and to appoint special
65
commissioners for that purpose.
2. Limit of Jurisdiction-Amount Involved.-A suit to enjoin the
collection of a tax judgment and have it declared void is necessarily
a suit in chancery, and if the amount involved is less than fifty dollars, a chancery court has no jurisdiction to entertain it. The fact
that there are numerous other similar judgments does not avoid the
limitation as to each judgment debtor. The court suggested that the
tax payer is not without remedy since common law certiorari is
66
available.
3. Quia Timet To Determine Disputed Boundaries.-Where the
bill alleges that plaintiff has conveyed one tract of land by deed
warranting title and seisin, and the boundary is uncertain because one
line of boundary was formerly recognized and another is now
claimed, chancery has jurisdiction to determine the dispute.6 7 It seems
reasonably clear that there is no adequate remedy at law, even by
the statutorily enlarged action of ejectment. Chancery should furnish
a remedy in the nature of a declaratory judgment.
D. ContinuingJurisdiction
A court which renders a decree of divorce has no power to de68
prive itself of its statutory authority to retain control of the decree.
E. Acquisition of Jurisdiction-Enforcementof Mechanic's Lien
In a suit to enforce a mechanic's lien, the action must be commenced
within ninety days after notice of the lien to the owner of the
premises, and the lien is enforced "by attachment upon petition at
law or bill in equity filed under oath." The levy of the attachment
is the commencement of the suit. The issuance of the writ is without
effect until levy thereunder. Hence a writ issued within the ninetyday period but not levied until after the period has expired does not
69
satisfy the statutory requirement.
64. Durham v. Dismukes, 333 S.W.2d 935 (Tenn. 1960).
65. Ex parte Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 330 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1959).
66. Tritschler v. Cartwright, 333 S.W.2d 6 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
67. Patterson v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., 330 S.W.2d 344 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
68. Thomas v. Thomas, 330 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
69. Knoxville Structural Steel Co. v. Jones, 330 S.W.2d 559 (Tenn. App.
E.S. 1959).
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F. Supreme Court-PowerTo Revise Sentence
Where the accused is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the
supreme court has constitutional authority to grant a petition that
the time spent by defendant in jail awaiting trial be counted as part
of the time specified in the sentence. Mr. Justice Tomlinson dissented from this proposition where the sentence is fixed by the jury
and the statute specifically authorizes the trial judge to take such
action. The dissent assumes that the matter is regulable by statute
70
and is not controlled by any constitutional mandate.

VIII. TiiiA
A. Right to Jury Trial
1. In CriminalProsecution.-Even if an accused may validly waive
trial by jury in a criminal case, no waiver is effective as to the imposition of a fine exceeding fifty dollars. Article VI, section 14 of the
Tennessee Constitution provides: "No fine shall be laid on any
citizen of this State that shall be in excess of $50 unless it shall be
assessed by a jury of his peers." Hence if on a jury-waived trial the
judge finds defendant guilty and is of opinion that a fine of more than
$50 should be imposed or if the statute prescribes a minimum of more
than $50, he must impanel a jury to fix the fine within the limits
71
required by the applicable statute.
2. Question of Law-Unlawful Search and Seizure.-It is clear that
the question of whether a search and seizure was unlawful so as to
require the evidence procured thereby to be held inadmissible is
for the judge and not for the jury. Hence if in a jury-waived trial
if the evidence thus procured is essential to support a finding of guilt,
72
the judge should acquit the defendant.
3. Procedure in Habitual Criminal Charge-Separate Trial of
Charge.-Defendant was charged with third-degree burglary and
with being an habitual criminal. The trial judge at the close of the
State's evidence on the burglary charge submitted the case to the
jury without mention of the habitual criminal count. After the
jury returned a verdict of guilty, the judge then submitted the
evidence of three prior convictions on the habitual criminal count
to the same jury but did not on this count submit anything as to the
immediately preceding conviction. The defendant objected that the
count separately considered in this way entitled him to additional
peremptories. The supreme court approved the trial judge's action
70. Douglass v. State, 330 S.W.2d 8 (Tenn. 1959).
71. State v. Moore, 332 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn. 1960).
72. Ibid.
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and held that the habitual criminal count did not charge a capital
offense and did not entitle defendant to fifteen peremptory challenges.73 It seems too clear for argument that this procedure afforded
defendant ample protection. The indictment gave him fair notice
of the offense charged; no evidence of the former convictions prejudiced the consideration of the burglary charge, and a completely separate trial of the habitual criminal charge would have served no useful purpose or given defendant any appreciable advantage.
4. In Chancery.-The supreme court has dispelled the uncertainty
created by Doughty v. Grills7 4 concerning the right to a trial by jury
of a suit over which a common law court had no jurisdiction and in
which there is no constitutional right to a jury. In that case the
court of appeals declared that a verdict by the jury approved by the
chancellor in an action for an injunction was advisory only, that on
appeal the review was a de novo proceeding and that the correct
finding was contrary to the verdict. Now in Moore v. Mitchell75 the
supreme court interprets the statutory phrase "elsewhere excepted by
law" 76 as denoting "excepted by other statutes." In effect, it also
includes actions or suits "which by their very nature must necessarily
be inappropriate for submission to a jury such as contempt for violating an injunction or cases of a complicated and intricate nature
involving mixed questions of law and fact such as laches or estoppel."
Therefore when a party has demanded trial by jury of six specified
issues, it is error for the chancellor to withdraw them from the jury
and make findings on each of them in favor of defendant if a trier
of fact could reasonably have found for the plaintiff on one or more
of the decisive issues. In short, the jury in equity has exactly
the same function under the statute as to each issue as a jury in a
strictly legal action. 7 But when the chancellor, after refusing to
empanel a jury at the request of a party and to submit to it a group
of issues, has empanelled a jury of his own motion, he may submit
78
to it only such questions of facts as he desires.
B. Selection of Jurors-Challenges-Peremptory
Granting to the state an additional peremptory after the jury had
been sworn, and allowing it to be exercised to remove a juror who
was accepted while defendant had an unexercised peremptory constitutes error, but whether it is prejudicial depends upon the cir73. Beeler v. State, 332 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. 1959).

74. 37 Tenn. App. 63, 260 S.W.2d 379 (E.S. 1952).
75. 329 S.W.2d 821 (Tenn. 1959).
76. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 21-1011 (1956).

77. Henry v. Southern Fire & Cas. Co., 330 S.W.2d 18 (Tenn. App. W.S.
1958).
78. McDade v. McDade, 325 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
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cumstances. The court ruled it harmless within the harmless error
statute on the authority of Nelson v. State,79 in which the court reviewed the previous decisions and pointed out that the allowance
of even one extra peremptory may be cause for reversal and the
allowance of as many as three may not be so, depending largely on
whether the finally selected jurors were fair and impartial and
whether the rejected juror was for special reasons highly desirable
for the accused. In the instant case the trial judge exercised a sound
discretion in allowing the extra peremptory.8 0 It seems good policy
to bear in mind that a party is not entitled to have a particular
juror sit in his trial, but to be careful to apply this principle only
where it will not operate as an unjust discrimination against him.
This is especially true if he is the defendant in a criminal prosecution.
C. Dismissalor Abandonment of Claim
A defendant who has pleaded a set-off but informs the court that
he has brought a separate action for the same claim and offers no
evidence to support the set-off, has thereby abandoned the set-off and
cannot thereafter assert that the trial judge erred in over-ruling the
plea. 81 This ruling seems so obviously correct as to cause amazement
that it should ever have been seriously questioned.
D. Instructions
1. Requests for Instructions-Requisites.-The instruction which a
party requests the court to give must be accurate and complete. Thus
in an action by a flying school against an advanced student for
negligently destroying a plane in an emergency landing, there is no
error in refusing to charge that a flying school assumes responsibility
for the competence and skill of a student in flying a plane in the
course of instruction without adding the qualification "unless the
student violated the instructions given in respect to the particular
operation in which he was engaged at the time of the alleged negligence." Obviously the unqualified proposition requested would convey a totally wrong impression to the jury as to the respective obligations of the plaintiff and the defendant.8 2 And the judge need not
give the requested instruction even if accurate when he covers the
83
same matter adequately in his general charge.
2. Curative Instructions.-Where a witness on direct examination
79. 200 Tenn. 462, 292 S.W.2d 727 (1956).

80. Hopper v. State, 326 S.W.2d 448 (Tenn. 1959).
81. John H. Moore & Sons v. Adams, 324 S.W.2d 499 (Tenn. App. M.S.

1959).

82. Morton v. Martin Aviation Corp., 325 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. 1959).
83. Luckey v. Gowan, 330 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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gave to a proper question an unresponsive answer which was both
inadmissible and highly prejudicial, an order striking the answer
and an instruction promptly given directing the jury to disregard
it may justify the refusal to declare a mistrial. In such a case the
ruling is largely within the discretion of the trial judge.84 The same
is true where an improper answer is asked which does not indicate
the expected answer but does reveal that the witness testified in
another trial, and the judge instructed the jurors to disregard all
references to an earlier trial.85 But when plaintiff's attorney deliberately injected into a personal injury action the fact that defendant was insured against liability and argued for its admissibility
in evidence, the misconduct was not cured by counsel's belated
apology and the trial judge's instruction to the jury to disregard the
entire matter.86 In view of the attitude of the Tennessee courts
toward the supposed effect upon jurors of knowledge of liability
insurance, and the repeated decisions condemning counsel for intentionally disclosing its existence, the result was to be anticipated. It
might be suggested that the treatment of this subject by courts
generally is totally unrealistic in current conditions. It is almost a
matter of current notoriety that practically all financially responsible motorists and operators of business of any importance do carry
liability insurance.
3. Burden of Proof.-Under section 24-515 of the Tennessee Code if
it is shown that a bailee received the bailed chattels in good condition and returned them in damaged condition, the bailee has the
burden of introducing evidence that the damage was not due to his
negligence or other fault. But when the bailor's complaint alleges
specific acts of negligence of the bailee and the judge charges clearly
that the burden is on the bailor to prove the truth of these allegations,
it is not error for the judge to charge that under the statute the
defendant must show the damage was not due to his fault or negligence. Taken as a whole the instruction puts on the bailor-plaintiff
the burden of persuading the trier of fact and on the defendant the
burden of producing evidence.87 It must be clear that these two
portions of the charge were inconsistent and confusing. If the
burden is only one of producing evidence, the jury has nothing to
do with the problem of its satisfaction; if it affects the weight to
be given the evidence when introduced, the question then arises as
to the propriety of charging on the weight of the evidence. But as
so often happens in Tennessee, in opinions dealing with so-called
84. Graham v. Smith, 330 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
85. O'Brien v. State, 326 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1959).
86. Woods v. Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
87. Morton v. Martin Aviation Corp., 325 S.W.2d 524 (Tenn. 1959).
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Cprima facie evidence" and presumptions, the instant decision is not
enlightening.
4. Contents-(a) Completeness-Matters in Iss.ue.-The judge
should confine his instructions to the matters which are litigated or
subject to litigation in the case. This is particularly true in criminal
cases. It is reversible error to instruct a jury to consider a charge
against defendant which is not included in the indictment. 88 But if
the instructions treat a proper issue meagrely, they are not for that
reason erroneous. The party desiring greater particularity must call
the matter to the judge's attention so as to afford him an opportunity
to supply the alleged omissions. 89 The courts have so stated again
and again, but with little apparent effect upon many members of the
bar.
(b) In Criminal Cases.-The rule in criminal prosecutions that the
judge must give the standard instruction on circumstantial evidence
is not applicable where there is direct evidence of the fact charged. 90
(c) Effect of Stipulation of Fact.-A stipulation of fact takes the
objective fact out of the realm of dispute, but where reasonable
men might draw different inferences from the fact, it is for the
jury to draw the inference. Thus, where the stipulated fact was
specified objective conduct of an injured party, whether the conduct constituted negligence and whether it was the proximate cause
of the injury were questions for the jury which should have been
subject of proper instructions by the trial judge. 91
E. Motion ForDirected Verdict
1. Distinguished from Demurrer to Evidence-Time for.-In Sadler
v. Draper92 the court took occasion to state the distinction between
a common law demurrer to evidence and a motion for a directed
verdict under modern practice. The demurrer could be interposed
only after the party having the burden of persuasion (usually the
plaintiff) had rested; it had to be in writing and correct in form.
If it was so, then the opposing party was required to join and the
only issue was whether on the evidence and all inferences to be drawn
therefrom a jury would be justified in finding a verdict for the party
having that burden. If yes, then there must be a finding for him;
if no, there must be a finding for the opposing party. The only issue
left after the demurrer was overruled was as to the amount of
88. Church v. State, 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).

89. Luckey v. Gowan, 330 S.W.2d 45 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959); Woods v.

Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

90. Birdsell v. State, 330 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1959).
91. Woods v. Meacham, 333 S.W.2d 567 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
92. 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
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damage. On the issue of liability no evidence could be introduced
by either party. A motion for a directed verdict may usually be
made only at the close of all the evidence and if it is overruled, the
moving party may present his argument to the jury. When the
court permits a defendant to make the motion at the close of plaintiff's evidence and denies the motion, the defendant may introduce
evidence but must renew the motion at the close of all the evidence;
otherwise, the previous ruling is not reviewable. Similarly where
there are two defendants and both of them properly move for a
directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's case, and the motions are
denied, if one defendant immediately rests while the other proceeds
to offer evidence, the one must renew his motion at the close of all
the evidence and, as against him as well as against the other, the
court must consider all the evidence. If the evidence introduced by
the second defendant adversely affects the case of the first defendant,
it will prevent a directed verdict for him. Thus, in an action brought
against defendants as master and servant, at the close of plaintiff's
evidence the master rested and his motion for a directed verdict was
denied. Thereafter testimony was introduced in behalf of the servant
affecting the issues as to the relationship between the defendants and
the alleged master's liability. The failure of the master to renew
his motion at the close of all the evidence had the same effect as if
he had waived the motion.93
2. The Scintilla Rule.-The usual test for determining the motion
is whether a reasonable jury could find more than one way. If the
court is of opinion that a jury might reasonably find in favor of the
party having the burden of persuasion, a motion for a directed verdict
for the opponent will be denied. In considering a motion to direct
a verdict for the party having that burden, it must be remembered
that the credibility of witnesses is for the determination of the jury,
but where no reasonable jury could fail to find for him and the facts
established by the evidence raise a presumption of the ultimate fact
involved, the opponent's introduction of evidence which, if believed,
would constitute only a scintilla or glimmer of probative value is
not sufficient to meet the presumption or preclude a directed verdict.
These propositions were applied in a will contest in which contestant
attacked a will on the grounds of testator's incapacity. The will was
duly executed in the presence of respectable, intelligent witnesses in
accord with all requirements of the applicable statute. The evidence
of no substantial value was a recitation of trivial instances of testator's conduct and some lay opinion based thereon. 94
93. Sadler v. Draper, 326 S.W.2d 148 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
94. Curry v. Bridges, 325 S.W.2d 87 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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3. Effect of Party's Own Testimony.-Plaintiff, a girl 16 years old,
after testifying generally as to the accident in question, denied
categorically and in detail the truth of every allegation of specific
acts of negligence contained in her pleading and declared that she
knew nothing concerning its contents. The trial judge directed a
verdict for defendant as against her. The court of appeals affirmed. 95
The only noteworthy feature of this situation is that counsel had the
intrepidity to assign the ruling as error. The only possible justification for his filing a pleading containing these allegations is his
probable reliance upon statements of others without checking them
by consulting plaintiff herself. Certainly he could never justify
signing such a complaint if rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure were in force in Tennessee.
4. In Criminal Prosecution.-Even where there is no dispute as to
the existence of a fact which constitutes a necessary element of a
crime, an instruction that the fact exists is reversible error. The court
has consistently refused to consider the harmless error doctrine as
applicable in this situation. 96 This may be justified by the theory that
in all prosecutions the jury and not the judge is to determine all
matters affecting guilt. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why our Tennessee courts disapprove the practice of entertaining a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Yet this disapproval is constantly reiterated and of course makes inapplicable
any claim of error in the ruling of a trial judge denying such a
97
motion.
F. Verdict
1. Special Interrogatories.-In a personal injury action the trial
judge has discretion to determine whether or not to submit special
issues to the jury. Certainly where the issues are not numerous or
complicated, he does not abuse his discretion in refusing to do so.98
2. Polling Jury-Effect of Answer.-On the polling of the jury
by the trial judge, one juror answered that he "had gone along"
with the others; the trial judge construed this answer as meaning
that the juror had reluctantly agreed only because of the persuasion
of the other eleven, and held the verdict a proper verdict of all
twelve. His ruling was approved. 99 To have held otherwise would
have opened to question every verdict reached only after long deliberation, and would make difficult sustaining any verdict reached
by a jury after first reporting a disagreement.
95. Wagner v. Niven, 332 S.W.2d 511 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
96. Hooper v. State, 325 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1959).
97. Church v. State, 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).
98. Shell Oil Co. v. Blanks, 330 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
99. Donahue v. George, 329 S.W.2d 836 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
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G. Taxation of Costs-MotionTo Retax
A motion by defendant for retaxing costs awarded against him
will not be entertained in the supreme court. It must be made in the
court which taxed the costs. 100
IX. JUDGMENT

1. Final-What Constitutes-In Justice Court-Splitting.-Plaintiff brought action for property damage in a court of the justice
of the peace, alleging negligent injury to his automobile in a collision
with defendant's car. While the trial was continuing it appeared that
defendant was a conditional vendee of the car and that attachment of
it in a justice's court was unauthorized. The judge endorsed "on the
back of the warrant a judgment for $200 in favor of plaintiff" and
thereupon "defendant left the court-room." The plaintiff's request
that the action be dismissed was granted. It does not appear how
long an interval elapsed between defendant's leaving and plaintiff's
request. In a later action by plaintiff in the circuit court for injuries
to his car and to his person, the court held that the justice's endorsement on the warrant did not constitute a final judgment. After
verdict and judgment for $2500 in favor of plaintiff, the supreme
court held that the endorsement was a final judgment, and that the
dismissal was totally ineffective. By reference to the statutory provision which authorizes plaintiff to dismiss before final submission to
the court "and not afterwards"' 0 ' the court must have assumed that
the case had been "finally submitted" when defendant left the court
room, although it is obvious that the magistrate considered its
decision only tentative, and that the proceeding had not terminated
so far as the plaintiff and the magistrate were concerned. The court
applied the rule established in Tennessee and a majority of states that
damage to plaintiff's person and property by a single wrongful act
creates a single cause of action, and that a judgment in an action
seeking to recover for either is a complete defense to a later action
for damage to the other.10 2
2. Final Judgment in Criminal Prosecution for Violation of Game
Law.-When a defendant has been acquitted of a criminal charge
for violation of the game laws by certain specified conduct, the judgment has no effect upon a proceeding by him to recover from the
state the property seized or condemned as contraband on account of
that specified conduct. The statutory proceeding before the Director
of the Fish and Game Commission for the recovery of such property is
100. Kasper v. State, 333 S.W.2d 934 (Tenn. 1960).
101. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1311 to -13 (1956).

102. Staggs v. Vaughn, 325 S.W.2d 277 (Tenn. 1959).
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separate and distinct from any action or proceeding for the criminal
prosecution for violation of the statute forbidding the taking of fish
103
or game.
3. Costs-When Properly Included-Divorce.-In a divorce action
the chancellor may properly award to the wife a sum of money as
counsel fees, but they are not to be taxed as costs and included as
such in the judgment or decree. 10 4

X. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

A. Contents-Form
In Tennessee practice there is no motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as a remedy for error in refusing to direct a verdict.
The motion in Tennessee, as at common law, is directed only to the
sufficiency of the common law record and is usually available only
to a plaintiff when defendant's pleadings show no defense so that
plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment. But on a motion for a new
trial on the ground of error in denying a motion for a directed
verdict, the remedy is the same as that directly provided for by
statute in most states. In Pickard v. Ferrell0 5 the court of appeals
treated a motion to set aside the verdict and to enter judgment for the
moving party as if it were a motion for a new trial for error in refusing to grant his motion to direct a verdict. This is an illustration
of the usual attitude of Tennessee appellate courts in looking to substance rather than form in most procedural controversies.
B. Grounds ForNew Trial
1. IrregularitiesAffecting the Jury.-It is no ground for a new trial
that the jury in a criminal case took their meals in the common
dining room of a hotel and occupied several separate rooms during
the night when each of them testified that no one even tried to talk
to him and that he did not discuss the case with anyone. 106 The old
common law rule that any separation vitiated the verdict has been
generally abandoned. Some prejudicial effect of the separation must
be shown. The same is true where the officer having custody of the
jurors has left them unattended while procuring food or clothing for
them. The fact that they may have had an opportunity to hear a
broadcast of the news is insufficient to require the trial judge to
declare a mistrial or to grant a new trial when the record shows
103. State v. McCrary, 326 S.W.2d 473 (Tenn. 1959).
104. Raskind v. Raskind, 325 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
105. 325 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
106. Blackwood v. State, 325 S.W.2d 262 (Tenn. 1959).
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nothing further concerning the incident. 107
2. Misconduct of Juror.--A juror on the voir dire examination
stated that he had formed no opinion concerning the accident in
question. On the hearing of a motion for a new trial he testified that
he knew of a blinking red light at the scene of the accident and used
his knowledge of it in considering the evidence. The trial judge, while
holding the juror free from conscious fault, found him to be not a
fair and impartial juror and granted the motion. On appeal the
court of appeals reversed. On certiorari the supreme court held
that the court of appeals was in error in ruling that the trial judge
had abused his discretion in granting the new trial.10 8 It is rather
clear that the juror's testimony did not show his answer as to forming or expressing an opinion to be false or mistaken. The real problem
was whether, on recalling seeing the blinking light and finding its
pertinence to the issue of negligence, he should have revealed the
matter to the trial judge.
3. Verdict Against the Evidence.-In most jurisdictions it is clear
that in granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict is contrary
to the evidence, the trial judge has a wide discretion. Because he has
seen and heard the witnesses, his decision will be supported although
the written record may show a preponderance in favor of the verdict.
But he may refuse to grant a new trial when he disagrees with the
verdict but finds that the record contains evidence which a reasonable
jury could believe and which, if believed, would support the verdict.
In Tennessee, however, if the judge, had he been a juror, would not
have voted for the verdict as rendered, it is his duty to set the verdict
aside and grant a new trial. He is said to be the thirteenth juror.
Consequently, when the judge grants a new trial because dissatisfied
with the verdict, his ruling is not reviewable. 10 9 This anomalous
doctrine is so thoroughly a part of the Tennessee system that its
reiteration in an opinion is not worth noting. But it may be well
to call attention to it as a desirable safeguard against erratic jury
verdicts where the record shows no objective reversible error. It
counteracts in a great measure the impediments to judicial control
of jury action imposed by the prohibition of comment by the judge
upon the weight of evidence or credibility of witnesses, and the
prohibition against direction of verdicts of acquittal in criminal prosecutions.
4. Excessive Damages.-Where the verdict is not so excessive as
to indicate passion or prejudice, the fault of excess may be cured by
107. O'Brien v. State, 326 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1959).
108. Meacham v. Woods, 325 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1959).
109. Dykes v. Meighan Constr. Co., 326 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. 1959).
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a remittitur. Thus, where the jury returned a verdict of $2,450 for
plaintiff's personal injuries and $750 for the destruction of his
motorcycle, and the undisputed evidence showed the value of the
motorcycle to be $371, counsel for plaintiff suggested that the error
could be cured by remittitur on defendant's motion for a new trial,
and the judge then accepted the verdict. On the later motion by
defendant, the judge denied the motion on condition that plaintiff
remit the excess. On appeal from the judgment after remittitur, the
court of appeals affirmed on the ground that there was no showing
of passion or prejudice. 110
5. Punitive Damages.-In an action for seduction of plaintiff's 16year-old daughter, evidence offered by defendant of previous misconduct by the daughter and of grave misconduct by the mother was
met by denials and by explanations of apparently unfavorable incidents. The jury were justified in awarding compensatory and punitive
damages, and a verdict for a large sum did not indicate passion or
prejudice requiring a new trial."'
C. Requisites of Order Disposing of Motion
After verdict for plaintiff, defendant's motions for a new trial were
duly made, and the trial judge, following conclusion of the arguments
at the hearing thereon, orally stated that the motions were overruled
and on the court files of the cases made notation of his ruling on each
motion. Before the orders overruling the motions were entered on
the minutes, the trial judge died. His successor entered on the minutes
a recital of the notations made by the judge and then an order and
judgment that the motions "are in all respects overruled and denied."
The court of appeals held that the order of the successor was void.
The trial court "speaks only through its minutes." The statute requiring a new trial where the trial judge dies "prior to the hearing
of the motion for a new trial"" 2 has no application. The case was to
be "restored to the docket for trial as upon a continuance."" 3 Does
this work any different result from what would be reached if the
statute were applicable? Why should the trial judge's written endorsement upon the files have not been treated as effective in this
situation where all substantial requirements relevant to the determination of such a motion had been fulfilled?
110. Fitzsimmons v. Brock, 330 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
111. Graham v. Smith, 330 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
112. TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 17-117 (1956).

113. Jackson v. Handell, 327 S.W.2d 55 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1959).
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XI. APPEAL AND ERROR
A. In FormaPauperis-InWhat Actions Allowed
On appeal from a judgment of a general sessions court which was
for a specific sum of money or the return of specified chattels to the
possession of which plaintiff was entitled, the circuit court ruled
that appellant was required to file an appeal bond and could not
appeal in forma pauperis because he still retained the chattels. On
further appeal the supreme court held that since plaintiff had given
no replevin bond, the action had been properly treated as in detinue
and defendant was entitled to retain the chattels during the appeal.
To prevent his wrongful disposition of the chattels during that
period, plaintiff's remedy was to apply for a pertinent order. 1 4
B. PreliminaryRequisites-Bill of Exceptions
1. Time for.-The statute, providing that when the last day of the
prescribed thirty-day or ninety-day period falls on a Sunday the
period is extended an additional day, 115 is retroactive. It applies to
proceedings pending at the time of the passage of the statute as well
as to those begun thereafter." 6 But a decree against the petitioner in
a habeas corpus proceeding which allowed him 45 days to perfect
his appeal did not extend the prescribed thirty-day period for filing
his bill of exceptions. On appeal from the decree, a bill of exceptions
filed after this period had expired cannot be considered. The court
7
can review only the technical record."
2. When Required.-Where a stipulation of facts is entered on the
technical record and is complete in itself, no bill of exceptions is
necessary. But where exhibits are attached to the stipulation which
the trial judge must consider, a bill of exceptions is required. It must
be filed within thirty days unless within that period a longer time
is fixed by the court; otherwise it cannot be considered on appeal." 8
But when the circuit court on common law certiorari entered judgment ordering a beer board to return to petitioner the license which
it had revoked, the facts (a) that the court's judgment was based on
stipulated facts and (b) that no additional evidence could have been
introduced in the circuit court did not excuse appellant from the
requirement of a motion for a new trial. That no bill of exceptions
was necessary because of the adequacy of the technical record in
the case did not change the result; the appeal was dismissed. 19
114. Swan v. Williams, 330 S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1959).
115. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-111 (1956).
116. O'Brien v. State, 326 S.W.2d 759 (Tenn. 1959).
117. State v. Bomar, 329 S.W.2d 813 (Tenn. 1959).
118. Industrial Credit Co. v. Beckman, 333 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1960).
119. Shelton v. Mooneyhan, 326 S.W.2d 825 (Tenn. 1959).

1230

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 13

C. Scope of Review
1. Simple Appeal-(a) Decree in Equity-Trial Without a Jury.On a simple appeal in equity, review by an appellate court includes
both issues of law and issues of fact; the court considers the record on
the facts de novo. Where at the trial the evidence is oral a bill of
exceptions is required, but no motion for a new trial is necessary.
There is a presumption that the judgment is correct on the facts, but
if the appellate court finds that the evidence preponderates against
it, the presumption is overcome. Such is the procedure provided by
statute in Tennessee 120 in all actions tried without a jury. And it is
in accord with the practice in many code states where issues of fact
are tried by oral evidence or by evidence partly oral and partly
presented by written depositions. In classic English equity practice
all evidence was by written depositions and there was no presumption
on appeal in favor of the findings by the lower officer or tribunal.
The current practice is described in Lowe v. Caledonian-American
Ins. Co.' 21 In ruling on claims against a decedent's estate, the hearing
is without a jury by the probate judge, and review is by a simple
appeal whether or not the testimony is oral.' 22
(b) Effect of Finding of Trial Judge Approved by Court of Appeals.
-Where the evidence was uncontroverted and the trial judge has
found that defendant was not guilty of actionable negligence and
that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, and the court of appeals
has concurred, the supreme court does not review the evidence de
novo but considers only whether there is any material evidence to
123
support the findings and whether the conclusions of law are correct.
2. Workmen's Compensation Case.-In an appeal from the decree
of the chancellor in a workmen's compensation case, the supreme
court determines only (1) whether there is any evidence in the
record to support his finding and (2) whether he has committed any
error of law.124
3. Complicated Account.-In an action to recover a balance due
on a complicated account, the chancellor empanelled a jury as demanded by the defendant. At the close of the evidence plaintiff
moved that no issue be submitted to the jury because the issues were
too complicated to be determined by a jury and included mixed issues
120. TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-303 (1956).

121. 324 S.W.2d 420 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959). See also Gable v. Tennessee
Liquified Gas Co., 325 S.W.2d 657 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1957).
122. Rich Printing Co. v. Estate of McKellar, 330 S.W.2d 361, (Tenn. App.
W.S. 1959).
123. Overbey v. Poteat, 332 S.W.2d 197 (Tenn. 1960).
124. American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. McClung, 333
S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1960).
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of law and fact. The chancellor granted the motion and disposed of
the case in a written opinion. The supreme court held that the review
was to be as on a simple appeal de novo with a presumption in favor of
The contract was in writing and,
the correctness of the findings.m'
of course, its interpretation was for the judge. But the facts involved in the account were in dispute. Even under the Tennessee
statute there is no right to a trial by jury of an issue involving an
intricate and complicated account.
4. Divorce Action-Omission of Finding.-Ina divorce action it was
a part of the plaintiff wife's case to prove that she had no knowledge
that her husband's former marriage had not been dissolved; there
was no bill of exceptions and the chancellor made no express finding
in her favor. On appeal the court of appeals held that the decree in
her favor required the assumption that the chancellor had made
126
the finding by inference.
5. Evidence Erroneously Excluded.-Where defendant's mental and
emotional attitude toward members of his family was relevant as to
his capacity to execute the contract sought to be set aside, the
chancellor erred in excluding proffered expert psychiatric opinion
evidence. The court on a simple appeal considered the evidence de
novo including that erroneously excluded. In the particular situation, the error was harmless, for the probative value of the excluded
127
opinion was slight.
D. DiscretionaryAppeal
In an action on a sworn statement of account, D answered that P's
claim was for a balance alleged to be due from D under a contract
between D and C for work performed thereunder by P as a subcontractor of C, and that the work was defectively done to D's damage
in a stated amount and asked judgment against C for that amount
and that the answer be treated as a crossbill against C. C answered
the crossbill and asked that his answer be treated as a crossbill against
P. On P's motion to dismiss C's crossbill or to grant a severance, the
chancellor granted a severance and allowed C a discretionary appeal.
On motion to dismiss the appeal the supreme court held that a discretionary appeal will not be dismissed where allowance of the
appeal will furnish the chancellor a guide to final disposition of the
case. Here the crossbills were properly interposed, for a new party
may be brought in on a crossbill, and, as to C's crossbill, its consideration and disposition would settle the entire controversy. Since
125. Town of Alamo v. Forcum-James Co., 327 S.W.2d 47 (Tenn. 1959).
126. Hill v. Hill, 326 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).

127. McDade v. McDade, 325 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
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all the disputes arose from the same transaction, it was highly desirable that they be settled in one proceeding; hence, it was an abuse
of the chancellor's discretion to order a severance.128

XII. RECORD ON APPEAL
1. Inconsistent Provisions-Effect of.-On appeal the technical
record of the trial included a recital of the contents of the verdict,
and the bill of exceptions recited the verdict as reported by the jury.
Insofar as the recitals were inconsistent, the bill of exceptions was
controlling. 129 And a recital in the bill of exceptions that it contains
all the evidence will be disregarded where it affirmatively appears
that other evidence was introduced which might have been material.
Hence, on such a record the supreme court considers not whether
there was sufficient evidence to support the judgment against the
defendant county but whether on the record any judgment against
defendant properly could have been entered. 130 Likewise a finding
of fact by the chancellor which has no evidence in the record to sup131
port it will not be considered.
2. Omission of Material Details-Effect.-Alleged error in the
misconduct of prosecutor in his final argument cannot be considered
where the argument is not set forth in the record; 132 and where the
record on appeal shows that the court gave instructions to the jury
but the instructions are not copied in the transcript of the trial
record, the court of appeals must assume that they were in all
respects correct. 133 Even if the instructions do appear, an alleged error
therein is no ground for reversal if there appears to have been no
objection at the trial, no reliance on it as a ground for the motion for
a new trial, and no pertinent assignment of error.134 It would be a
most unusual case in which an appellate court would pay any attention
to an attempt to secure consideration of such an alleged error.
3. Inclusion of Improperly Authenticated Matter.-Where the probate judge disallowed a claim and was absent from the state on the
last day for claimant to move for an extension of time to file a bill
of exceptions, the special judge acting in his place made an order
extending the time. Within the extended time the claimant filed his
bill of exceptions and it was included in the record on appeal. On
motion to strike the bill from the record, the court of appeals held
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Ralph Rogers &Co. v. Allied Constr. Co., 326 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1959).
Church v. State, 333 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1960).
State v. Stewart, 326 S.W.2d 688 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
Id. at 697.
Caruso v. State, 326 S.W.2d 434 (Tenn. 1958).

133. Pickard v. Ferrell, 325 S.W.2d 288 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).
134. Barnard v. Binns, 326 S.W.2d 676 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1959).
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the order of the special judge void and proceeded to consider the
appeal on the technical record only, which included the probate
judge's findings of fact. 135 Only the probate judge had the power to
sign such an order.
4. Diminution of Record-Amendment of Record.-An amendment
to a pleading cannot be permitted in the supreme court, and to allow
a defendant to crave oyer of a writing so as to make it a part of
the trial record would have the same effect. Hence, to grant diminution of the record for that purpose would be futile.136 This device for
supplementing the record on appeal cannot be used to change the
trial ceurt's record. And the record on appeal cannot be amended
by filing in the appellate court materials which should have been included in a bill of exceptions. Thus affidavits in support of a motion
for a new trial are not part of the technical record and cannot be
made part of the record on appeal by filing in the appellate court an
affidavit of the judge that they were all the evidence introduced at
137
the hearing of the motion.
5. Assignment of Error-(a) Necessity for-Time for Filing.Where the chancellor has denied a discretionary appeal, the error, if
any, will not be considered when the record on appeal contains no
But failure to file assignassignment of error for this ruling. 1'
ments within the time prescribed by the rules of the appellate court
will be excused if sufficient explanation for the failure is shown as, for
example, illness of counsel or excusable ignorance of inexperienced
counsel. 139
(b) Specification.-An assignment that the decree in favor of the
employee in a workmen's compensation case is contrary to the law
140
and evidence is too general to be considered by the supreme court.
6. Disposition on Appeal-(a) Judgment Contrary to Verdict.When on his motion for a new trial the defendant assigns error in
the trial judge's refusal to grant his motion for a directed verdict,
and the appellate court finds that on all the evidence in favor of
plaintiff no reasonable jury could have found against defendant, the
appellate court will enter judgment for the defendant. Thus the
same result is accomplished as under the typical statute in code states
135. In re Lewis Estate, 325 S.W.2d 647 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
136. Holland Bros. Elec. Co. v. M. W. Kellogg Co., 326 S.W.2d 649 (Tenn.
1959).
137. Baldwin v. State, 325 S.W.2d 244 (Tenn. 1959).
138. McDade v. McDade, 325 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1958).
139. Hopper v. Davidson County, 333 S.W.2d 917 (Tenn. 1960); Tedesco v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 326 S.W.2d 837 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1958).
140. American Bridge Div., United States Steel Corp. v. McClung, 333
S.W.2d 557 (Tenn. 1960).

1234

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL.

13

which provides specifically for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
4
as the remedy for error in refusing to direct.' '
(b) Where Record Contains Wayside Bill of Exceptions.-Where
defendant files a wayside bill of exceptions to an order granting
plaintiff a new trial, and on the new trial plaintiff secures a verdict
and judgment, the court, on appeal from the judgment, first considers the errors alleged in the wayside bill. If it finds that the order
granting the new trial was erroneous, it restores the original verdict
and orders judgment thereon. This means that the alleged errors in
the record of the second trial are not considered. But such a judgment in the court of appeals is subject to review on certiorari; and
if the supreme court holds that the trial judge was correct in granting
the new trial, the appeal is still pending in the court of appeals
and the supreme court will remand the case to the court of appeals
142
for consideration of the record on the second trial.
XIII.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CASES

1. Presumptions.-There is a strong presumption that the officials
of a state acted properly in placing the name of a candidate upon the
143
official ballot.
2. Evidence-(a) Hearsay-Official Record-Judgment.-In an
action to recover certain assets of the bankrupt debtor from defendant creditor, to whom the debtor had delivered them in payment
of the creditor's claim, on the ground that the transfer was an unlawful preference, the judgment in the bankruptcy proceeding adjudging the debtor a bankrupt is inadmissible as tending to prove
his insolvency as against the creditor who was not a party to the
proceeding. 144
(b) Opinion.-Evidence by a witness who, so far as the record
shows, had incomplete information as to the extent of the assets
owned by another at a given date, that in his opinion that other was
145
then insolvent is inadmissible.
3. Jurisdiction of Person-Service of Process.-Where a complaint
against a non-resident motorist was filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee four days before the
termination of one year after the alleged injury, the agency of the
141. Cawthorn v. Mayo, 325 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1959).

142. Meacham v. Woods, 325 S.W.2d 281 (Tenn. 1959); Dykes v. Meighan

Constr. Co., 326 S.W.2d 135 (Tenn. 1959).
143. Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Tenn. 1958).

144. Allender v. Southeast Tractor & Equip. Co., 178 F. Supp. 413 (M.D.

Tenn. 1959).

145. Ibid.
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Secretary of State to receive process as provided by statute continued
so long as necessary to complete the service. If action was begun
within the year, the agency of the Secretary expired at the end of
the year, except where further time was needed to enable him to
complete service of process. Thus where (1) the clerk of the court
delivered the summons and complaint to the marshal and he by
mistake mailed them to the marshal in the district of defendant's
residence instead of serving them on the Secretary of State, and (2)
discovery and correction of the mistake delayed service on the
Secretary and mailing to defendant for a period thirty-three days after
the end of the year, the court held the delay excusable and denied
46
defendant's motion to quash.
4. Jurisdiction of Subject Matter-(a) Habeas Corpus-Condition
Precedent.-The accused in a criminal prosecution in the Tennessee
trial court objected to the admission of a confession on the ground
that it had been coerced. The judge after hearing outside the presence
of the jury held that it was not improperly secured and admitted the
evidence. The state supreme court affirmed the judgment of conviction. On appeal from the decision of the district court denying a
writ of habeas corpus, the court of appeals held that the accused, as
petitioner in habeas corpus proceedings, could not raise the same
issue and said further that he must first exhaust all state remedies
147
including a petition for habeas corpus addressed to a state judge.
Query, is the availability of the remedy of habeas corpus in a state
court within the rule requiring exhaustion of state remedies?
(b) Tucker Act.-An action by plaintiff to recover from the United
States the proceeds of bonds owned by plaintiff received by the
Collector of Internal Revenue in payment of taxes due from plaintiff's
father is an action on a contract implied in law; i.e., created by the
law, and not one on a contract implied in fact; i.e., logically inferred
from the conduct of the parties and therefore the equivalent of an
express contract. The Tucker Act 148 is applicable only to consensual
contracts and not to obligations created regardless of the intention
or consent of the obligor, though remediable in the contract action
149
that is the successor of the common law action of general assumpsit.
(c) Enjoining Assessment or Collection of Taxes.-When plaintiff
alleges that a tax assessed against him should have been assessed
against another, he has an adequate remedy at law in that he may
pay under protest and sue to recover back the amount paid. Conse146. Proctor v. Hendrick, 174 F. Supp. 270 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
147. Wooten v. Bomar, 267 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1959).
148. 28

U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2) (1958).

149. Holbert v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
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quently his case presents no exception from the statute'50 proscribing
suits to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes. 51
(d) Federal Question-Removal from State Court.-In an action
for wrongful death the plaintiffs alleged as the cause of the death
negligent conduct of defendant in violating rules and regulations
promulgated under the Federal Civil Aeronautics Act 5 2 but alleged
nothing requiring interpretation of them. The complaint therefore
did not reveal a federal question as a basis for jurisdiction of the
United States district court and consequently did not warrant removal
53
of the action from the state court.
(e) Action Under Miller Act.-A foreign corporation not authorized
to do business in Tennessee is nevertheless a proper party plaintiff
in a United States district court in an action on a bond given under
the Miller Act, 154 for the act provides that such an action must be
brought in the name of the United States in a United States district
court. This makes the Tennessee statute on the same subject inappli55
cable.1
5. Scope of Review-Referee Under Social Security Act.-The finding of the referee that the applicant for disability benefits was not
disabled from engaging in a substantial gainful activity is final if
supported by substantial evidence. Where the record includes such
evidence, the government is entitled to summary judgment 5 6
XIV. SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS
1. Remedies-Motion To Vacate Sentence.-A motion to vacate
sentence cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal nor can it challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the sentence imposed
57
by the court after a plea of guilty.
2. Evidence-(a) Illegally Obtained.-Intoxicating liquors unlawfully seized by state officers without the knowledge of any officer of
the United States is admissible in evidence, and where admitted
without objection, the defendant may not on appeal assign its reception as error158 But the doctrine applied in this case has been
rejected by the Supreme Court in decisions of June 27, 1960. The
150. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7421(a).
151. Nussbaumer v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 128 (M.D. Tenn. 1959).
152. 72 Stat. 737, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1958).
153. Dennis v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Tenn.
1959).
154. 49 Stat. 793, 794 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270(a) - (d) (1958).
155. United States v. Milan Constr. Corp., 168 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Tenn.
1958).
156. Chesney v. Flenming, 180 F. Supp. 437 (E.D. Tenn. 1960).
157. Clark v. United States, 273 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1959).
158. Nichols v. United States, 276 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1960).
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majority of the Court in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stewart declare
that since security of privacy guaranteed by the fourth amendment
as against the United States is essential to a system of ordered
liberty, the whole basis for making a distinction between a search
made by a federal officer and one made by a state officer has been
destroyed and that the question for a United States judge is whether
the search, if made by a United States officer, would have been a
violation of the fourth amendment; if so, then the evidence obtained
by the search by a state officer is inadmissible. There was a strong
dissent by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in which Justices Harlan, Clark
and Whittaker joined. 159
(b) Hearsay-(1) Deposition of Parties.-Where subcontractors who
were parties gave testimony by deposition in discovery proceedings
and afterward appeared at the trial as witnesses, the court ruled that
the pretrial depositions were admissible only to affect their credibility.
This was error for Federal Rule 26 (d) (2) provides, in effect, that
they are receivable and usable as admissions. But the error was
harmless in this case for it appeared from the record that the jury
credited the oral testimony of the witness and there was nothing in
the depositions if used as affirmative evidence which could reasona160
bly be considered as affecting the result.
(2) Charts.-Where an expert witness produces charts, it is proper
procedure to permit him to identify them, explaining them as summarizing his own testimony and that of other witnesses. 161 The
opinion does not go into detail on this point, and it must be assumed
that his qualifications and the sources of his information were not
questioned.
(c) Witnesses-(1) Privilege-Identity of Informer.-The prosecution need not disclose the identity of an informer where the informer
was in no way connected with the commission of the offense and
there is no showing that disclosure of his identity would further
162
defendant's defense.
(2) MaritalPrivilege.-In a prosecution of defendant for a violation
of the Mann Act, 163 the defendant has no privilege that the victim
shall not testify against him even though she is now his wife. The
majority of the Supreme Court in this case adopt this view of the
courts of appeals of the several circuits that have passed upon the
question, holding it applicable whether the victim was married to
159. Elkins v. United States, 80 Sup. Ct. 1437 (1960); Rios v. United States,

80 Sup. Ct. 1431 (1960).

160.
161.
162.
163.

Glenn v. United States, 271 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1959).
Barber v. United States, 271 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1959).
Pegram v. United States, 267 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1959).
18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1958).
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defendant at the time of the offense or later. In the Hawkins case 164
there was some suggestion in one opinion that the wife might have
a privilege to refrain from testifying even though defendant had no
privilege to prevent her from doing so. But that notion is now repudiated. In a prosecution for violation of the Mann Act neither the
defendant nor his wife has any privilege that the wife shall not
testify against him. Here she was the person transported although
she was a participant in the plan to secure other prostitutes. 165
(d) Weight-Sufficiency.-The testimony of an accomplice may be
sufficient to support a verdict of guilty. It is good practice to warn
the jury that such evidence is to be viewed with suspicion. The fact
that the accomplice expects to profit personally by testifying goes
only to the value of his testimony and is to be considered by the
166
jury.
Although it is generally true that inadmissible evidence received
without objection is to be considered by the jury for what it is intrinsically worth, yet where evidence of declarations of one defendant, made out of the presence of the other, is received against the
other without objection and without this inadmissible evidence a
verdict of guilty could not be sustained, the court of appeals may
167
notice this palpable error and reverse the judgment of conviction.
3. Jurisdiction-Court of Appeals.-The court of appeals has no
original jurisdiction to enjoin the warden of a Tennessee state penitentiary from interfering with a prisoner's preparation in prosecuting
168
an appeal from an adverse judgment in a habeas corpus proceeding.
4. Trial-(a) Objections to Evidence-Necessity.-Where a party
makes no objection to the construction of a hypothetical question put
to a witness, he cannot complain on appeal that the question was
improperly framed. This is particularly true when the trial judge
charged correctly on the consideration to be given to the expert
opinion, leaving the jury free to exercise its untrammeled judgment
as to its weight or value. The court relies upon United States v.
Johnson169 in which the opinion received was upon an ultimate issue
170
for the jury.
(b) Right of Trial by Jury-Waiver.-An accused may waive his
right to a trial by jury with the consent of the court and the prosecut164. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
165. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 529 (1960) (Warren, C.J., Black
and Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
166. Nichols v. United States, 276 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1960).
167. Glenn v. United States, 271 F.2d 880 (6th Cir. 1959).
168. Wooten v. Bomar, 266 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1959).
169. 319 U.S. 503, 519 (1943).
170. Barber v. United States, 271 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1959); see also Nichols
v. United States, 276 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1960).
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is in open court in a written stipulaattorney and by an assistant United
in its discretion refuse to allow him
offense charged was not a capital

5. Judgment-Res Judicata-Double Jeopardy.-A plea of guilty
not withdrawn is a bar to a later prosecution for the same offense,
but not for prosecution of another offense. Thus a plea of guilty to
a charge of passing counterfeit money in Nashville on one occasion
does not bar a prosecution for passing other counterfeit money on a
72
later occasion in Memphis.
6. New Trial-Misconduct of Juror.-Where a juror takes an unauthorized view of cattle, the value of which is an important issue, he
is guilty of misconduct, but whether the misconduct was of sufficient
gravity to require setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial
is a matter to be decided by the judge in the exercise of his discre73
tion.
7. Appeal and Error-(a)What is Appealable.-No appeal lies from
an order granting a new trial, 7 4 and the power to review an order
overruling a motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict is
excessive is held to be very limited. 75 Why this is so in terms of
power, it is very difficult to understand. Though it is doubtless good
policy to be reluctant to interfere in such instances, there is little to
be said in favor of limiting the authority of the court in this respect.
(b) Scope of Review Finding of Fact.--The court of appeals in a
case tried without a jury does not disapprove the findings of fact
unless "clearly erroneous." A finding is not clearly erroneous unless
the court on reviewing the entire evidence is left with a definite and
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed; and the burden is
upon the appellant to make this appear to the court. 7 6
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Riadon v. United States, 274 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1960).
Ibid.
Aluminum Co. of America v. Loveday, 273 F.2d 499 (6th Cir. 1959).
Ibid.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Morris, 273 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1960).

176. S. G. Johnson, Inc. v. Johnson, 266 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1959).

